After World War II, collective bargaining agreements greatly expanded the availability of employer-sponsored pension plans. 3 The Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 laid the foundation for the regulatory and disclosure system that governs employer-sponsored plans today. 4 Finally, after almost a decade of wrangling, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).
5 ERISA protects the pension benefi ts of most private-sector workers through sweeping vesting, funding, reporting, fi duciary and disclosure rules on plans; it also established the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation. More recently, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 established a new regime for taxing most nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements, 6 and the Pension Protection Act of 2006 tightened the funding rules for private pension plans. 7 The Pension Protection Act also encourages automatic enrollment in Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter IRC) § 401(k) plans and makes it easier for 401(k) plan sponsors to provide investment advice to participants.
B Overview of the current US pension system
American workers now receive nearly one-third of their compensation in the form of fringe benefi ts. 8 For example, fringe benefi ts made up 30.2 per cent of the average employer cost for employee compensation of civilian workers in March 2007 (BLS 2007a . Employers are generally required to provide legally mandated benefi ts for such programs as Social Security, unemployment compensation and workers' compensation, and these now account for 7.9 per cent of compensation. In addition, many employers provide such other benefi ts as pensions and other deferred compensation, health benefi ts, paid leave, educational assistance and dependent care assistance.
The most important fringe benefi ts are health care and retirement plans, and Table 19 .1 shows the percentage of private-sector workers participating in the major employer-sponsored health care and retirement plans (BLS 2006) . The overall coverage rate for retirement plans has held relatively steady in recent years, with about half of private-sector employees participating in an employer-sponsored retirement plan; but, as more fully explained below, there has been a shift away from traditional defi ned benefi t plans and toward defi ned contribution plans, especially 401(k) plans. Table 19 .1 shows that the probability of having pension and health care coverage is greater for white-collar workers, for full-time workers, for union workers and for workers at larger fi rms. The empirical evidence also shows that the probability of fringe benefi t coverage is greater for older workers, whites, highly educated workers and higher-income workers (Schwabish, 2004; Table 19 .5 below).
It is important to note that the United States has a 'voluntary' pension system. Employers are not required to have pension plans, but if they do, they are subject to regulation. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs most private retirement plans.
Most pension plans qualify for favorable tax treatment. Basically, an employer's contributions to a qualifi ed plan on behalf of an employee are not taxable to the employee when made. 9 The pension fund's earnings on those contributions are tax-exempt. 10 Workers pay tax only when they receive distributions of their pension benefi ts, and, at that point, the usual rules for taxing annuities apply.
11 Meanwhile, the employer is allowed a current deduction (within limits) for its contributions to the plan. 12 The federal government routinely identifi es these deviations from normal income tax rules as tax expenditures in the tax expenditure budgets it prepares annually. For example, the 2009 Federal Table 19 .1).
C The international experience
Developed nations use four basic approaches to encourage the private sector to provide pensions for their workers (Rein and Turner 2004) . Like the United States, some countries have voluntary private pension systems and use tax incentives to encourage employers to cover their employees ('voluntary with incentives'). Japan and the United Kingdom use a second approach called 'contracting out.' Under this approach, employers and workers may reduce their A third approach is 'labor contracting'. In countries where most of the labor force is covered by collective bargaining agreements, most workers are covered by private plans. In some countries (such as the Netherlands), the terms of those collective bargaining agreements are extended to other fi rms in the same line of business.
Finally, a few countries mandate private pensions (World Bank 1994; Forman 1995) . Under this approach, the government can either require employers to provide pension plans for their workers, or it can require workers to have an individual retirement savings account managed by third-party providers. For example, private pension coverage is mandatory in Australia and Switzerland. Chile requires its workers to contribute at least 10 per cent of their wages to the privately managed individual retirement savings accounts that replaced that country's social security system.
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2 Types of pension plans Pension plans generally fall into two broad categories based on the nature of the benefi ts provided: defi ned benefi t plans and defi ned contribution plans (Internal Revenue Service 2007b, p. 12) . Most of these plans qualify for favorable tax treatment and are referred to as qualifi ed plans. In addition, nonqualifi ed deferred compensation plans are often used to provide benefi ts to executives and other highly compensated workers.
A Defi ned benefi t plans
In a defi ned benefi t plan, an employer promises employees a specifi c benefi t at retirement. To provide that benefi t, the employer typically makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow with investment returns, and eventually the employer withdraws funds from the trust fund to pay promised benefi ts. Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Benefi ts are typically guaranteed by the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation.
Defi ned benefi t plans often provide each worker with a specifi c annual
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Also of note, a number of countries -including Sweden and Poland -have recently replaced all or a portion of their traditional social security systems with hypothetical individual account systems -'notional defi ned contribution plans' -that look a lot like American-style cash balance plans (Brooks and Weaver 2005; Williamson 2004; Sundén 2004) . retirement benefi t tied to the worker's fi nal average compensation and number of years of service. For example, a plan might provide that a worker's annual retirement benefi t is equal to 2 per cent, times the number of years of service (yos), times fi nal average compensation (fac) (B 5 2 per cent × yos × fac). Under this fi nal-average-pay formula, a worker with 30 years of service would receive a retirement benefi t equal to 60 per cent of her pre-retirement earnings (B 5 60 per cent × fac 5 2 per cent × 30 yos × fac). Final average compensation is typically computed by averaging the worker's salary over the last three or fi ve years prior to retirement.
B Defi ned contribution plans
Under a typical defi ned contribution plan, the employer contributes a specifi ed percentage of the worker's compensation to an individual investment account for the worker. For example, contributions might be set at 10 per cent of annual compensation. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30 000 in a given year would have $3000 contributed to an individual investment account for her ($3000 5 10 per cent × $30 000). Her benefi t at retirement would be based on all such contributions plus investment earnings. Defi ned contribution plans are also known as 'individual account' plans because each worker has her own account, as opposed to defi ned benefi t plans, where the plan's assets are pooled for the benefi t of all of the employees.
There are a variety of diff erent types of defi ned contribution plans, including money purchase pension plans, target benefi t plans, profi tsharing plans, stock bonus plans and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
Profi t-sharing and stock bonus plans may include a feature that allows workers to choose between receiving cash currently or deferring taxation by placing the money in a retirement account according to IRC § 401(k) . Consequently, these plans are sometimes called '401(k) plans'. The maximum annual amount of such elective deferrals that could be made by an individual in 2008 was $15 500, although workers over the age of 50 could contribute up to $20 500. 14 C 'Hybrid' retirement plans Alternatively, many employers rely on hybrid retirement plans that mix the features of defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans. For example, a cash balance plan is a defi ned benefi t plan that looks like a defi ned 14 
Internal Revenue Service 2007(c).
Gerrit De Geest -10.4337/9781781953068.00031 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/26/2018 10:07:23PM via free access contribution plan (Forman and Nixon 2000) . Like other defi ned benefi t plans, employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities. Like defi ned contribution plans, however, cash balance plans provide workers with individual accounts (albeit hypothetical). A simple cash balance plan might allocate 10 per cent of salary to each worker's account each year and credit the account with 5 per cent interest on the balance in the account. Under such a plan, a worker who earned $30 000 in a given year would get an annual cash balance credit of $3000 ($3000 5 10 per cent × $30 000), plus an interest credit equal to 5 per cent of the balance in her hypothetical account as of the beginning of the year.
D Individual retirement accounts and Keoghs
Favorable tax rules are also available for certain individual retirement accounts (IRAs). 15 Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other fi nancial institution. In 2008, individuals without pension plans could contribute and deduct up to $5000 to an IRA (individuals over age 50 could contribute and deduct up to $6000), and spouses could contribute and deduct similar amounts. If a worker is covered by another retirement plan, however, the deduction may be reduced or eliminated if the worker's income exceeds $53 000 for a single individual or $85 000 for a married couple (in 2008) . Like private pensions, IRA earnings are tax-exempt, and distributions are taxable.
Also, since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth IRAs.
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Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not deductible. Instead, withdrawals are tax-free. Like regular IRAs, however, Roth IRA earnings are tax-exempt. Finally, Keogh plans give self-employed workers an ability to save for retirement that is similar to plans that employers sponsor, and Keogh plans allow self-employed workers to contribute more than they could otherwise contribute to an IRA.
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E Nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements
Nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements are contractual arrangements between employers and employees (or independent contractors) that are not qualifi ed plans. deferred compensation arrangement is merely an unsecured, unfunded promise to pay a stated dollar amount at some point in the future. There are a variety of diff erent types of nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements, including top-hat plans, excess benefi t plans, 'make-up' or 'mirror' plans and phantom stock plans.
Nonqualifi ed deferred compensation agreements generally do not receive as favorable a tax treatment as qualifi ed plans. In particular, the employer is generally not entitled to deduct nonqualifi ed deferred compensation until that compensation is includible in the gross income of the employee. 19 On the other hand, nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements are not subject to the limits applicable to qualifi ed employer plans.
F Retiree health benefi ts
Also of note, some employers provide health care coverage for their retired workers, although such coverage is on the decline. Only 28.7 per cent of retirees aged 55-64 had health care coverage from a former employer in 2002, down from 39.2 per cent in 1997 (Fronstin 2005) . Similarly, only 13 per cent of private employers off ered health benefi ts to their retirees in 2003, down from 22 per cent in 1997.
Private-sector employers are not required to promise retiree health benefi ts. 20 Furthermore, when employers do off er retiree health benefi ts, nothing in federal law prevents them from cutting or eliminating those benefi ts -unless they have made a specifi c promise to maintain the benefi ts. 
Regulation of pension plans
In the more than 30 years since it was enacted, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act has been amended numerous times, and a whole regulatory system has grown up to enforce its provisions. The key agencies charged with the administration of ERISA are the Internal Revenue Retirees -at least those over age 65 -typically pay for their health care expenses with a combination of Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, and a supplemental insurance policy from their employer or otherwise. Retirees also inevitably incur additional out-of-pocket expenses. All in all, it has been estimated that an individual who retires at age 65 in 2005 and lives to age 80 will need $112 000 in savings to pay for Medicare Part B premiums, an employment-based health insurance policy to supplement Medicare, and $1800 a year in out-of-pocket expenses (Fronstin and Yakoboski 2005 Under ERISA, pension plans must be operated for the exclusive benefi t of employees or their benefi ciaries, and plan assets generally must be held in a trust. 25 To protect the interests of plan participants, ERISA requires signifi cant reporting and disclosure in the administration and operation of employee benefi t plans. For example, a typical pension plan will have to fi le reports with the IRS, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation, and it will have to provide a summary plan description and a summary annual report to each participant.
ERISA also imposes extensive fi duciary responsibilities on employers and administrators of employee benefi t plans. 26 In addition, prohibited transaction rules prevent parties in interest from engaging in certain transactions with the plan. 27 For example, an employer usually cannot sell, exchange or lease any property to the plan.
ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code impose many other requirements on retirement plans, including rules governing participation, coverage, vesting, benefi t accrual, contribution and benefi ts, nondiscrimination and funding. 28 Also, a plan may not exclude employees from participation just because they have reached a certain age (for example, age 65). Employees can be excluded for other reasons, however. For example, a plan might be able to cover only those employees working at a particular location or in a particular job category.
B Coverage
Under the minimum coverage rules, a pension plan must usually cover a signifi cant percentage of the employer's workforce. 29 Alternatively, a plan may be able to satisfy the minimum coverage rules if it benefi ts a certain class of employees as long as it does not discriminate in favor of the employer's highly compensated employees.
C Vesting
Pension plans must also meet certain minimum vesting requirements.
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A worker's retirement benefi t is said to be vested when the worker has a nonforfeitable right to receive the benefi t. Under the fi ve-year, cliffvesting schedule, an employee who has completed at least fi ve years of service must have a nonforfeitable right to 100 per cent of her accrued benefi ts.
31 ERISA only imposes minimum vesting requirements; plans are free to use a faster vesting schedule. Nevertheless, most plans use fi ve-year cliff vesting. In 2005, for example, 84 per cent of employees in private industry defi ned benefi t plans faced the fi ve-year cliff -vesting schedule, and only 2 per cent of plans provided vesting in less than fi ve years of service. Alternatively, under three-to-seven-year 'graded' vesting, an employee must have a nonforfeitable right to 20 per cent of her accrued benefi t after three years of service, 40 per cent after four years of service, and so on up to 100 per cent after seven years of service. 
D Benefi t accrual
In keeping with the voluntary nature of our pension system, employers have relatively great freedom in the design of their pension plans. ERISA does not mandate any specifi c benefi t levels, nor does it require that benefi ts accrue evenly over time. Minimum benefi t accrual rules do, however, limit the extent to which employers can 'backload' benefi ts in favor of their long-service employees.
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Another benefi t accrual rule bars employers from reducing or ceasing an employee's benefi t accruals just because they have reached a certain age (for example, age 65), but employers are permitted to design their plans in ways that result in benefi t reductions that merely correlate with age, for example, by restricting the number of years of benefi t accrual (for example, 30 years).
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E Limits on contributions and benefi ts
The Internal Revenue Code also imposes limits on contributions and benefi ts. 35 In 2008, for example, generally no more than the lesser of $46 000 or 25 per cent of compensation can be added to the individual account of a participant in a defi ned contribution plan.
36 Also, the maximum annual amount of elective deferrals that can be made by an individual to a 401(k)-type plan in 2008 is $15 500, although workers over the age of 50 can contribute up to another $5000. With defi ned benefi t plans, the highest annual benefi t that can be paid to a retiree in 2008 is $185 000 or 100 per cent of compensation. The highest amount of compensation that can be considered in determining contributions or benefi ts in 2008 is $230 000.
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F Nondiscrimination
Complicated nondiscrimination rules ensure that contributions or benefi ts do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. 38 Also, plans that provide more than 60 per cent of accrued benefi ts to key employees are 33 IRC § 411(b); ERISA § 204. A typical plan must comply with at least one of three alternative minimum benefi t accrual rules. For example, under the '3 per cent rule', a worker must accrue, for each year of participation (up to 33 and 1/3 years) at least 3 per cent of the normal retirement benefi t that she would receive if she stayed with the employer until age 65. IRC § 415. These limits appear only in the Internal Revenue Code, and they refl ect the government's desire to limit the ability of high-income workers to utilize the tax benefi ts of pension plans. via free access considered top-heavy and must meet more generous minimum vesting and benefi t-accrual requirements.
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G Other benefi t rules (i) Annuity payouts and lump-sum distributions
Defi ned benefi t plans are typically designed to pay benefi ts in the form of a lifetime annuity. For married couples, joint and survivor annuities and pre-retirement survivor annuities are the default form of distribution. 40 In recent years, however, defi ned benefi t plans have been moving away from paying annuities, with more plans off ering installment and lump-sum distribution alternatives (Mitchell with Dykes 2003) . Defi ned contribution plans typically make lump-sum distributions.
(ii) Normal retirement age and age discrimination ERISA generally defi nes 'normal retirement age' as the earlier of the time specifi ed in the plan or age 65. 41 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) outlawed mandatory retirement before the age of 65. 42 The limit was raised to 70 in 1978 and fi nally removed altogether in 1986. The ADEA generally prohibits employers from discriminating against workers over the age of 40. Also, since 1988, employers have been prohibited from ceasing benefi t accruals for employees who work beyond age 64 and from excluding participants who are hired within fi ve years of normal retirement age.
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These statutes clearly forbid a cessation of benefi t accruals or a reduction in the rate of benefi t accruals because of age, but they do not automati-39 IRC § 416.
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Treasury Regulation § 1.401-1(b)(1); ERISA § 205; IRC § § 410(a)(11), 417. Pension plans that off er an annuity as a payment option are required to provide a qualifi ed joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) as the normal benefi t payment for married participants. A QJSA is an immediate annuity for the life of the participant and a survivor annuity for the life of the participant's spouse. The amount of the survivor annuity may not be less than 50 per cent, or more than 100 per cent, of the amount payable during the time the participant and spouse are both alive. IRC § 411(b)(1)(H) prohibits a defi ned benefi t plan from ceasing accruals, or reducing the rate of benefi t accruals, 'because of the attainment of any age'. Similarly, IRC § 411(b)(2)(A) prohibits a defi ned contribution plan from ceasing allocations, or reducing the rate at which amounts are allocated, to a participant's account, 'because of the attainment of any age'. Parallel provisions are found in ERISA and in ADEA. ERISA § § 204(b)(1)(H)(i) and (ii); 29 USC § 623(i).
cally prohibit benefi t reductions that correlate with age. In fact, various exceptions expressly allow retirement plans to limit the total amount of benefi ts or the total number of years used to compute benefi ts. Still other exceptions to the age discrimination laws allow plans to provide subsidized early retirement benefi ts and Social Security supplements.
(iii) Premature distributions IRC § 72(t) generally imposes a 10 per cent tax on pension distributions made before an individual reaches age 59½, but there are numerous exceptions. For example, there is an exception for distributions that take the form of a lifetime annuity, and there are exceptions for distributions on account of disability or to cover high medical expenses. Distributions from an Individual Retirement Account can even be used to purchase a residence or pay college tuition.
(iv) Minimum distribution age On the other hand, IRC § 401(a)(9) generally requires participants in retirement plans to begin taking distributions soon after they reach age 70½. 44 Failure to take the required minimum distribution can result in a 50 per cent excise tax penalty on the excess of the amount required to have been distributed over the amount that actually was distributed. 45 In addition, a plan that fails to make the required minimum distributions can be disqualifi ed.
(v) Funding Retirement plans must also meet certain minimum funding standards. 46 These rules help ensure that the money needed to pay the promised benefi ts is set aside in a trust fund where it can earn income until it is used to pay benefi ts when the employee retires.
Title IV of ERISA also created the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to administer a new plan termination insurance program. Defi ned benefi t plans generally pay annual termination insurance premiums to the PBGC. In the event an underfunded plan terminates (for example, because the employer goes out of business), the PBGC guarantees payment of pension benefi ts to the participants, up to $51 750 per participant in 44 More specifi cally, distributions typically must begin no later than April 1 of the calendar year following the calendar year in which the employee attains age 70½. Distributions after the death of a plan participant must also meet certain minimum distribution requirements. An exception allows older workers with a pension plan from their current employer to delay distributions until they retire, but workers with pensions from prior employers and IRA holders must begin taking distributions from those plans soon after they reach age 70½. (Clark et al. 2004, p. 99; DeVaney and Chiremba 2005; Ando and Modigliani 1963) . The life cycle model assumes that workers try to maintain a consistent level of consumption over their lifetimes. Under the model, individuals start life with no inheritance and end it leaving behind no bequests. Individuals try to smooth out their average annual consumption, by borrowing when they are young, and earning enough during their working years to both repay their loans and save for retirement. Under the model, individuals have perfect foresight so they can save exactly enough so that they can live off their savings until death and die exactly when they run out of money. See Figure 19 .1.
The model is useful in helping to explain how people make choices about how much to invest in their schooling when they are young (that is, human capital), about how much to save and about when to retire. Empirical research provides a good deal of support for the life cycle model, but psychological factors are also quite important. That is, attitudes, subjective norms and other factors can also infl uence individual decisions about saving and retirement (DeVaney and Chiremba 2005).
B Behavioral economics
To be sure, individuals are not completely rational about saving for retirement. Among other things, most people think about retirement in terms of current dollars. They look at the current monthly benefi ts available to them from Social Security and their traditional defi ned benefi t plans, and they look at the apparently large sums accumulated in their defi ned contribution plans (and generally available to them only if they retire). As a result, a kind of 'money illusion' leads most older Americans to believe that they are better off fi nancially than they really are. 47 Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation, Pension Benefi t Guaranty Fact Sheet, http://www.pbgc.gov/media/key-resources-for-the-press/content/page13540.html (accessed July 7, 2008). The guarantee is lower for those who retire early or when there is a benefi t for a survivor. The guarantee is increased for those who retire after age 65. Unfortunately, infl ation after retirement almost invariably erodes the value of accrued pension benefi ts. Moreover, older workers often fail to consider how their benefi ts and needs will change over the course of their retirement (Steuerle et al. 1999 ). In addition, many older Americans underestimate their life expectancies. Moreover, most workers lack even a rudimentary understanding of the fi nancial resources required for a 20-or 30-year retirement. What looks like an adequate retirement income at age 55, 62 or even 65 may not be enough to live on at age 80 when work is not a likely option and savings have been depleted. In short, many older Americans overestimate their fi nancial ability to meet their future retirement income needs and, consequently, choose to retire too early. At bottom, the life cycle model assumes that workers are always rational actors who will make reasoned choices about how much to save. The reality, however, is that attitudes and many other psychological factors lead people to save less than the optimal amount: 'By and large, individuals are inert -with good intentions, poor follow-through, and bounded rationality. Loss aversion and decision-making biases often lead to unfortunate outcomes, including a poorly funded retirement' (DiCenzo 2007, p. 15 ).
That's where behavioral economics can help. Behavioral economics acknowledges the psychological aspects of decision-making in the real world. Behavioral principles can be used to help design pension plans to increase savings rates. For example, studies have shown that automatically enrolling people into 401(k) plans can achieve higher levels of participation, and automatically escalating the levels of their contributions can dramatically increase their level of savings Bernartzi 2007, 2004; Madrian and Shea 2001; VanDerhei 2007) . Workers tend to anchor to the default contribution rates and to default investment choices set by the plan, so employers need to give these defaults careful consideration if they want to optimize workers' retirement saving and investment outcomes (DiCenzo 2007; Mitchell and Utkus 2006) . Of note, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 provides incentives to plan sponsors that implement automatic features like automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans and gradual contribution rate escalation.
C The economics of tax deferral (i) Qualifi ed plans
The basic advantage of qualifi ed plans and traditional IRAs is tax deferral. Basically, an employer's contributions to a qualifi ed plan on behalf of an employee are not taxable to the employee when made; the pension fund's earnings on those contributions are taxexempt, and the workers pay tax only when they receive distributions of their pension benefi ts. Meanwhile, the employer is allowed a current deduction for its contributions to the plan. Table 19 .2 shows the value of the tax advantages associated with saving in a qualifi ed plan, as compared with saving in a regular savings account. A regular savings account is funded with deposits that come from after-tax income and accumulate only at an annual after-tax interest rate -that is, the interest or investment income earned in such an account is taxed annually. The table assumes that a person age 45 has $1000 in wages and wishes to save it for 15 years for purposes of retirement at age 60. The market interest rate during the full 15 years is assumed to be 8 per cent.
Consider Example 2 in Table 19 .2. The example assumes that the employee is in the 40 per cent income tax bracket when working and when retired. If the $1000 is paid directly to the employee, the employee would immediately pay $400 in tax and deposit $600 after tax into the savings account. That $600 savings account would earn 8 per cent interest, but the after-tax rate of return would be just 4.8 per cent. The $600 in the account compounded at 4.8 per cent interest over 15 years would yield $1212 which could be withdrawn tax-free. If the employer had instead contributed that $1000 to a qualifi ed plan, the full $1000 would have compounded at the 8 per cent pretax rate and yield $3172 at the end of 15 years. Upon withdrawal, that $3172 would all be taxed at the employee's 40 per cent income tax rate, leaving the employee with $1903 after tax. That is a net gain of $691 (57 per cent) over the regular savings account.
The examples in Table 19 .2 show the economic advantages of qualifi ed plans (and traditional IRAs) over regular savings accounts. The tax advantages are greatest for those in the highest tax brackets in their working years. There are also even greater advantages to deferring income for longer periods. The favorable tax treatment of qualifi ed plans increases the demand for pensions by workers, especially workers in higher tax brackets. As a result, workers in higher tax brackets are more inclined to seek employers that provide tax-favored pension benefi ts than workers in lower brackets (Fronstin 2000) . Similarly, workers in higher brackets are likely to voluntarily contribute a greater proportion of their income to 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement Accounts than workers in lower tax brackets.
(ii) The saver's tax credit Also of note, since 2002, certain low-and moderate-income individuals have been able to claim a tax credit of up to $1000 for certain qualifi ed retirement savings contributions. 49 The credit equals a percentage (50 per cent, 20 per cent or 10 per cent) of up to $2000 of contributions. In eff ect, the credit acts like an employer match: the government matches a portion of the employee's contributions. Employer matches encourage workers to contribute, at least up to the match level, and the saver's tax credit seems to have similar pro-savings eff ects (Gale and Orszag 2003; Southworth and Gist 2008) .
(iii) Roth arrangements Contributions to Roth IRAs and Roth 401(k) plans are made after-tax; however, withdrawals are tax-free. Accordingly, these arrangements off er essentially the same tax economic benefi ts as qualifi ed plans and traditional IRAs. For example, following Example 2 in Table 19 .2, assume that an employee in the 40 per cent tax bracket paid $400 tax on $1000 of earnings and contributed the remaining $600 to a Roth IRA with an 8 per cent tax-free interest rate. After 15 years, that investment would be worth $1903, exactly what the employee would have had with the traditional qualifi ed plan.
(iv) Nonqualifi ed deferred compensations arrangements In nonqualifi ed deferred compensation arrangements, the employee postpones income, but the employer must delay taking a deduction. If the employee and employer have the same tax rate, there is really no advantage to a nonqualifi ed arrangement: the income from investing the deferred amount will be taxed the same either way. On the other hand, if the employer is in a lower tax bracket than the employee, then the employee is better off deferring (Langbein et al. 2006, pp. 358-9) . The advantage of deferral is largest when the employee is in the maximum federal and state income tax brackets and the employer is a tax-exempt organization. 
D The economics of pension funding
Defi ned benefi t plans make benefi t promises that can extend many years into the future. Historically, some plans simply paid those liabilities on a pay-as-you-go-basis. The triumph of ERISA was that it required plans to meet certain minimum funding standards. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles now also requires private companies and government entities to report how well they are funding their pension obligations.
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The minimum funding rules are fairly simple for defi ned contribution plans. The plan sponsor meets those requirements by contributing what the plan has promised. For example, a plan that promises to contribute 10 per cent of compensation meets its funding obligation when it deposits 10 per cent of compensation in the individual worker accounts.
The minimum funding rules for defi ned benefi t plans are more complicated. In order to have suffi cient assets to meet defi ned benefi t obligations that can extend for decades into the future, pension plan sponsors need to make current contributions and invest those contributions wisely. Plans usually employ an actuary to determine how well the plan is funded and how much the plan sponsor must contribute each year. Actuaries base those determinations on the plan's assumptions and the plan's experience about such important variables as employee turnover, mortality and future salary; infl ation and investment returns.
In order to determine if a pension plan is adequately funded, the plan actuary converts the future stream of pension payments into a 'present value' amount that would be needed to pay off those liabilities all at once. The actuary then compares that present value of the plan's liabilities to the current value of the plan's assets. A plan is said to be underfunded if the present value of the plan's liabilities exceeds the current value of its assets.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006 toughened the minimum funding requirements for private pensions. 51 In general, underfunded pension plans now have to amortize their unfunded liabilities over seven years.
Federal law does not, however, require state and local government pensions to be fully funded, and many are not (GAO 2008; Pew Center on the States 2007). Worse still, many state and local governments have committed themselves to provide retiree health benefi ts, for which pay-as-yougo fi nancing has been the norm. In the long run, underfunding of state and 50
The Financial Accounting Standards Board and Government Accounting Standards Board provide detailed guidance about how to determine annual pension expenses and about how to report plan assets and liabilities. local government pension and retiree health plans will present signifi cant fi scal and economic challenges.
E The economics of pension investing
At the end of 2007, there was $17.6 trillion in retirement assets, including $4.5 trillion in private defi ned contribution plans and $8.4 trillion in annuities, defi ned benefi t plans and federal, state and local pension plans. 52 The remaining $4.7 trillion was held in Individual Retirement Accounts. Pension plans try to use sound investment practices to invest their assets in accordance with the actuarial needs of the plan. The typical pension plan in the United States uses modern portfolio theory to choose a mix of stocks, bonds and other investments that balances risks and investment returns, somewhere on the so-called 'effi cient frontier'. Plans that need higher rates of return tend to invest more heavily in stocks, but they face greater volatility. On the other hand, plans that want less volatility invest more heavily in bonds and they consequently tolerate the generally lower rates of return that comes with those conservative investments.
The Pension Protection Act and the newest fi nancial accounting standards are pushing pension plans to focus more on managing the funding status of their plans. In particular, as corporations are now required to report funding shortfalls on their balance sheets, they will want to reduce the volatility in their pension investments. Many believe that this will push companies toward liability-driven investment strategies (LDI) that favor long-duration bonds over higher-yielding but volatile stocks (Morse 2007) . 53 Curiously, the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation recently announced that it was going in the opposite direction: the PBGC will dramatically reduce its bond holdings to just 45 per cent of assets, increase 52 Insurance Information Institute, 'Retirement', http://www.iii.org/media/ facts/statsbyissue/retirement/?table_sort_65276053 (accessed July 7, 2008).
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Pension liabilities look like bond obligations: a pension plan pays out fi xed amounts of benefi ts to retirees over many years. On the other hand, many plans seek to maximize their investment returns by investing in stocks: these higher risk assets are rewarded with higher returns -the so-called 'equity premium'. See, for example, Siegel (2002). Of course, stock and bond prices tend to move in opposite directions. For example, when interest rates go down, stock prices tend to go up, but bond prices go down, and the mismatch between a pension plan's stock investments and bond-like liabilities will periodically result in shortfalls which will now have an immediate and negative impact on the corporation's balance sheets. Liability-driven investment strategies lead plans to shift from stocks to longduration bonds and so reduce the mismatch between the duration and interest rate sensitivity of a plan's liabilities relative to its assets. its stock holdings to 45 per cent, and commit 10 per cent of its assets to alternative investment classes (Wyand 2008; Millard 2008) .
Another set of investment issues has to do with how participants in defi ned contribution plans invest the money held in their individual accounts. On average, individual employees tend to be pretty poor investors. They tend to invest too heavily in bonds and guaranteed investment contracts.
54 Also, when they do invest in stocks, individual employees tend to invest too heavily in the stock of their employers, as the recent Enron scandal showed (Stabile 2007; Langbein et al. 2006, pp. 638-48; Bernartzi et al. 2007 ). Individuals also tend to invest too heavily in US stocks (as opposed to foreign stocks). Also, when employees fail to make an affi rmative election about how to invest their 401(k) funds, many plans use a low-yield, stable-value bond fund as the default investment. All in all, one recent study found that traditional pension plans managed by investment professionals tend to get annual returns 1.9 percentage points higher than defi ned contribution plans where individuals tend to choose the investments (Goodman 2004). While much of that shortfall is attributable to higher fees, part is likely attributable to the poorer investment choices made by individual investors . 55 In recognition of the historically poor investment choices made by individual employees, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA § 404(c) to improve the default investments, and the new law encourages employers to replace their low-yield, stable-value bond funds with balanced funds (funds with an unchanging mix of stocks and bonds) and life cycle funds (funds which gradually shift their investments from stocks towards bonds as workers age) (Mitchell et al. 2007a ).
F The economics of Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insurance Federal pension law requires private sector defi ned benefi t plans to buy insurance from the Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). If the 54
Moreover, individuals tend to reduce their equity holdings as they get older, while large pension funds can continue to collect the equity premium in perpetuity. 55 Fees reduce the rate of return on 401(k) investments, and over the course of a lifetime, fees can reduce retirement savings signifi cantly. For example, imagine a 45-year-old employee who plans to leave $20 000 in a 401(k) account until retirement at age 65. If those assets earn a 6.5 per cent net annual return -a 7 per cent investment return minus a 0.5 per cent charge for fees, that $20 000 will grow to $70 500 at retirement. On the other hand, if fees are instead 1.5 per cent annually, that $20 000 investment will grow to just $58 400. That additional 1 per cent annual fee will reduce the account balance at retirement by around 17 per cent. GAO (2006, p. 7) . company goes bankrupt and the plan does not have enough assets to pay the promised pension benefi ts, the PBGC takes over paying those benefi ts to retirees up to the limits set by law. The insurance premiums charged by the PBGC are set by Congress rather than by market forces and are probably set too low (Brown 2007) . 56 For example, a 2002 study estimated that PBGC premiums at that time were about half the market price for the insurance (Boyce and Ippolito 2002) . Such underpricing of the insurance implies a taxpayer subsidy of questionable worth and may raise moral hazard problems with respect to company behavior. It remains to be seen whether the premium increases and other changes made by the Pension Protection Act of 2006 have reduced the subsidy.
The fi nancial incentives created by pension plans
Pension plan designs can create powerful fi nancial incentives that infl uence individual decisions about work and retirement (Forman 2006 (Forman , 2004 (Forman , 1999 Gustman and Steinmeier 1995; Ippolito 1986; Munnell et al. 2004; Leonesio 1996; Quinn et al. 1990) . At the outset, the tax preferences for pension savings reduce the work disincentives inherent in the taxation of earned income.
In addition, private pension plans can signifi cantly aff ect the timing of retirement. First, along with Social Security and other public benefi ts, private pensions help provide additional income and wealth that is needed for retirement. Second, traditional defi ned benefi t plans are typically designed to have fi nancial incentives that induce most workers to retire during 'windows' of opportunity that range from the plan's early retirement age through the normal retirement age. These plans provide large fi nancial incentives for workers to stay with a fi rm at least until they are eligible for early retirement, but they impose large fi nancial penalties on workers who stay past the plan's normal retirement age. Moreover, many traditional defi ned benefi t plans provide early retirement incentives that push older workers out of the workforce at even earlier ages. Defi ned contribution plans can also infl uence the timing of the decision to retire, but their eff ects are typically less dramatic (Ippolito 1997, pp. 10-17) .
Pertinent here, an important demographic trend is that Americans are living longer but retiring earlier. As Table 19 .3 shows, the life expectancy for a male born in 2006 is 75.0 years, up from 61.4 years in 1940.
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For plan years beginning in 2008, all single-employer pension plans pay a basic fl at-rate premium of $33 per participant per year. Underfunded pension plans pay an additional variable-rate charge of $9 per $1000 of unfunded vested benefi ts. Pension Benefi t Guaranty Corporation, 'Pension Insurance Premiums Fact Sheet', http://www.pbgc.gov/media/key-resources-for-the-press/content/page13541.html 
A Tax preferences for pension savings reduce the work disincentives inherent in the taxation of earned income
The favorable tax treatment for retirement savings generally reduces the work disincentives that can come from taxing earned income. Under current law, earned income is typically subject to federal income tax rates of up to 35 per cent and payroll tax rates of up to 15.3 per cent. But contributions to retirement plans are typically exempt from taxation, and benefi ts are typically not taxed until after retirement. 57 The net eff ect of this 57
More specifi cally, employer contributions to pension plans are exempt from current income and payroll taxation. Elective contributions by employees to 401(k)-type plans are also exempt from income taxation, but these contributions are subject to payroll taxation. Similarly, IRA contributions tend to be deductible for income tax purposes but not for payroll tax purposes. Distributions from tax regime is to reduce the eff ective marginal tax rates imposed on earned income and so reduce the work disincentives that result from the taxation of earned income. Also, the favorable tax treatment of pensions reduces the price of pension benefi ts for employers and employees and can be expected to increase the demand for pensions by workers, especially workers in higher tax brackets. 58 As a result, workers in higher tax brackets are more inclined to seek employers that provide tax-favored pension benefi ts than workers in lower brackets (Fronstin 2000; Pesando and Turner 2000; Reagan and Turner 2000) . Similarly, workers in higher brackets are likely to voluntarily contribute a greater proportion of their income to 401(k) plans and IRAs than workers in lower tax brackets.
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In short, exempting pension contributions and earnings from taxation tends to encourage people to work.
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B The accumulation of pension wealth encourages early retirement
On the other hand, the accumulation of pension wealth enables pension plan participants to retire earlier than they would in a no-pension world. Along with Social Security and Medicare, pensions provide a big chunk of the income and wealth that enable elderly Americans to choose retirement over work. Dora Costa argues that the decline in the average age of retirement is largely attributable to the increasing income and wealth of American families (Costa 1999; Sass 2003, p. 3) . From 1962 to 1995, the average net worth of American families increased from $114 000 to $206 000 (Committee for Economic Development 1999, p. 6). A large part of that increase is attributable to the rapid expansion of the private pension system after World War II. One study estimated that the growth of pensions could account for as much as one-quarter of the decline in labor force pension plans and IRAs are subject to income taxation but not payroll taxation. For international comparisons of the tax treatment of private pensions, see Yoo and de Serres (2004) and Forman (1997) . 58 One study fi nds that 'the income elasticity of worker contributions to a pension plan is approximately 1.5, indicating that if worker income increased by 10 per cent, contributions to a pension plan would increase by 15 per cent' (Fronstin 2000, p. 123) .
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Participating in a 401(k) plan may actually increase the lifetime tax burden on low-income workers. See, for example, Gokhale et al. (2001). 60 Because the income and substitution eff ects often work in opposite directions, the net eff ect on work eff ort is ambiguous and will depend heavily on individual preferences. Still, a fair amount of empirical evidence suggests that imposing high taxes on earned income tends to discourage work eff ort and reduce labor supply. See, for example, Richards (1999); Triest (1996) ; Eissa (1996); and Hausman (1981). participation in the early postwar period (Samwick 1998), and numerous studies have found that workers with access to pension income are more likely to retire than workers without such coverage (Munnell et al. 2004; Uccello 1998; Samwick 1998) .
Moreover, these income and wealth eff ects have an impact on people at all income levels (Committee for Economic Development 1999, p. 6). In particular, generous Social Security benefi ts and the health security provided by Medicare and Medicaid have made early retirement possible for virtually all Americans. Most analysts believe that the availability of full Social Security benefi ts at age 65 and the availability of reduced benefi ts at age 62 have greatly contributed to the trend toward earlier retirement (Advisory Council on Social Security 1997, volume 2, p. 21; Leonesio 1993) .
Of course, the income and wealth eff ects of pension plans probably have their greatest impact on the older workers in the upper half of the income distribution. While 64.7 per cent of workers with annual earnings of $50 000 participated in a pension plan in 2006, only 16.2 per cent of workers earning between $10 000 and $14 999 participated that year (see Table 19 .5 below). Similarly, while pensions accounted for 21. 
C Benefi t accrual patterns infl uence decisions about work and
retirement Pension benefi ts typically accrue diff erently under defi ned benefi t plans and defi ned contribution plans. In particular, under a traditional defi ned benefi t plan (that is, fi nal-average-pay plans), benefi t accruals increase signifi cantly the closer a worker gets to retirement.
Indeed, one of the most obvious features of traditional plans is that they are 'backloaded'. That is, traditional plans tend to disproportionately favor older workers who have stayed with an employer for 25 or 30 years. The primary reason for this backloading is that the value of benefi t accruals typically increases as a percentage of pay as workers approach retirement age. In fact, well over half the value of a worker's pension can accrue in the last fi ve or ten years of service (Ippolito 1997) . In short, traditional plans provide relatively larger benefi t accruals to older workers and relatively smaller benefi t accruals for younger workers.
On the other hand, defi ned contribution plans (and cash balance plans) typically provide more uniform accruals over a worker's career. Of course, that means that defi ned contribution plans provide larger benefi t accruals than fi nal-average-pay plans for younger workers and smaller benefi t accruals for older employees. Figure 19 .2 provides a graphic comparison between a typical defi ned contribution plan and a traditional defi ned benefi t plan. The fi gure compares the contributions made on behalf of an individual for the following two hypothetical pension plans. The fi rst is a simple defi ned contribution plan with a fl at contribution rate of 6 per cent of salary and interest accruing at 5 per cent per year. The second is a traditional defi ned benefi t plan that pays a pension benefi t at age 65 of 1 per cent times years of service times fi nal average compensation (B 5 1 per cent × yos × fac) -that is, a fi nal-average-pay plan.
As shown in Figure 19 .2, the defi ned contribution plan has a level contribution rate at all ages. It provides relatively larger benefi t accruals than a fi nal-average-pay plan for younger employees and relatively smaller benefi t accruals for older employees. The traditional fi nal-average-pay plan, on the other hand, is backloaded. It has severe fi nancial penalties for leaving too early and for working past the normal retirement age.
The diff ering rates of benefi t accrual under traditional fi nal-average-pay plans versus typical defi ned contribution plans result in diff erent incentives that can aff ect employee decisions about work and retirement. In particular, traditional fi nal-average-pay plans penalize workers who change jobs frequently. Traditional fi nal-average-pay plans also create large fi nancial incentives for workers to stay on the job at least until they are eligible for 
Figure 19.2 Annual contribution rates
Gerrit De Geest -10.4337/9781781953068.00031 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/26/2018 10:07:23PM via free access early retirement. Traditional plans also impose large fi nancial penalties on older workers that tend to push them out of the workforce once they have reached the plan's early or normal retirement age.
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(i) Traditional pensions penalize mobile workers Traditional fi nalaverage-pay plans also penalize workers who change jobs frequently (Olsen and VanDerhei 1997; Wiatrowski 2005) . Table 19 .4 shows the magnitude of these fi nancial penalties by comparing the retirement benefi ts of four workers. These workers all have identical 30-year pay histories (6 per cent annual pay increases starting at $20 000 and ending at $108 370), and all their employers have identical fi nal-average-pay plans (1.5 per cent times years of service times fi nal pay). The only diff erence among these workers is that the fi rst worker spent her entire career with one employer, while the other workers divided their careers over two or more employers. The long-tenure worker would receive a pension of $49 000 a year at retirement, but the worker who held fi ve jobs would receive pensions totaling just $27 000 a year. Mobile workers covered by a traditional fi nal-average-pay plan can 61 In short, 'relative to defi ned contribution plans, defi ned benefi t plans penalize early or late retirements' (Even and Macpherson 2003, p. 46) . suff er large benefi t losses every time they change jobs, and even greater fi nancial penalties can occur when workers change jobs without vesting (it usually takes fi ve years to vest). All in all, traditional fi nal-average-pay plans penalize workers who change jobs frequently. At the same time, however, traditional fi nal-average-pay plans create large fi nancial incentives for workers to stay with a single employer at least until they are eligible for early retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier 1995, pp. 13-14; Friedberg and Owyang 2004) . This is an example of the 'golden handcuff s' phenomenon.
(ii) Traditional pensions push workers into retirement Traditional fi nalaverage-pay plans also typically push older workers out of the workforce once they reach normal retirement age (often between ages 60 and 65). Once a worker reaches normal retirement age and is eligible to receive full retirement benefi ts, delaying retirement can be quite costly (Ippolito 1997, pp. 133-50) . 62 Those who delay retirement lose current benefi ts, but the increase in benefi ts that can result from an additional year of work rarely compensates for the benefi ts lost. On the other hand, those who work until they drop may leave nothing behind for their survivors.
Numerous studies of real world pension plans have found that particular plan designs can result in a signifi cant loss in pension wealth for employees who work past age 65 (Kotlikoff and Wise 1985 , 1989 . Moreover, employers can signifi cantly infl uence the timing of retirement by off ering subsidized benefi ts for workers who elect to retire early (Fronstin 1997; Lumsdaine et al. 1997) . Indeed, the structure of private pensions may have a greater infl uence than Social Security on decisions about the timing of retirement (Dulitzky 1999; Lumsdaine et al. 1997). 63 Explicit early retirement incentives are common among fi rms with traditional defi ned benefi t plans. At least 80 per cent of Fortune 500 companies have used early retirement incentive plans (Committee for Economic 62 According to the implicit contract theory, employers underpay their younger workers in exchange for overpayment later in their careers. The backloading of pension accruals encourages younger workers to stay with the company at least until early retirement age. At the same time, however, it gives employers a reason to discourage 'late' retirement (Casey 1997; Wise 1991). 63 According to Dulitzky, the following features of defi ned benefi t plans can be used to encourage workers to retire at a particular age: accrual rates that vary with age, earnings or years of service; wage indexing rules to calculate pensions that vary with age of retirement or years of service; reduction in the normal retirement benefi t for retiring early but by less than what would be actuarially fair; limits on the increase in pension accrual after a certain number of years in the fi rm; and explicit buyouts, off ered from time to time, to some of the workers in the fi rm (1999, p. 4) . Development 1999, pp. 24-5) . 64 It is also common for employers to design their plans in such a way that benefi t accrual rates turn negative at a relatively early age.
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For example, because early retirees will receive benefi ts for a longer period, an actuarial reduction in monthly benefi ts should be required, and it is often suggested that an actuarial reduction of at least 6 per cent a year is required for actuarial neutrality (Mitchell with Dykes 2003, p. 122) . However, traditional fi nal-average-pay plans often encourage workers to take their benefi ts prior to normal retirement by providing enhanced early retirement benefi ts (Freeman 2006) . 66 Current law permits employers to off er generous early retirement incentives and Social Security supplements. Current law also permits employers to design their plans in ways that impose fi nancial penalties on those who work past the plan's normal retirement age -for example, by not requiring that additional years of service (for instance, beyond 30 years) count toward the accrual of benefi ts.
In short, 'early retirement has been institutionalized' (Casey 1997, p. 20) . Traditional defi ned benefi t plans provide incentives for workers to retire during 'windows' of retirement opportunity that typically range from the 64 At the same time, however, there is not much evidence about why some fi rms have early retirement incentives and others do not (Dorsey et al. 1998, pp. 114-15) . 65 One study of benefi t accrual rates of defi ned benefi t plans in 1983 and 1989 found that by the time the workers in their study reached age 60, the median annual benefi t accrual was already close to zero (Gustman and Steinmeier 1998) . By age 62, many of the plans off ered normal retirement benefi ts, and the average benefi t accrual rate turned negative. At age 65, almost all the plans off ered normal retirement benefi ts, and average benefi t accruals were even more negative. This study also found that the average age for early retirement eligibility in these plans fell by about a year, from 54.2 in 1983 to 53.1 in 1989. Similarly, a recent study found that, in 1997, 21 per cent of participants in the defi ned benefi t plans of medium and large fi rms were able to retire at age 62 with full (unreduced) benefi ts, up from 17 per cent in 1981 (Mitchell with Dykes 2003) . That study also found that early retirement was permitted by some 95 per cent of defi ned benefi ts plans of those medium and large fi rms in 1997. More than 60 per cent of participants were able to leave by age 55 (in some cases, depending upon having enough years of service). In addition, many of these plans provided signifi cant subsidies for early retirement, such as providing less than actuarially neutral reductions in benefi ts.
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When workers retire prior to normal retirement age, their benefi ts should be actuarially reduced to refl ect that payments begin earlier and extend over a longer period. For example, the benefi t payable at age 64 is about 90 per cent of that payable at 65, and the benefi t payable at 55 should be about 37 per cent of that payable at 65 (McGill et al. 2005, p. 250, table 10-6) . However, plans often use more generous factors to compute early retirement benefi ts. For example, a plan might subsidize early retirement by allowing workers to retire at age 55 with 50 per cent of their normal retirement benefi ts, as opposed to the actuarially fair 37 per cent. early retirement age through the normal retirement age. The trend in recent decades has been toward a decline in the normal retirement age and toward incentives for early retirement.
Ultimately, the problem may boil down to the fact that employers often have economic incentives to rid themselves of older workers. Workers generally cost more to employ as they get older (Committee for Economic Development 1999; Munnell 2006; Minda 1994) . 67 As a result, the compensation of workers nearing the end of their careers can exceed their productivity (Minda 1994; Kotlikoff and Gokhale 1992) . When that happens, employers will have an economic incentive to avoid hiring or retaining older workers (Leibfritz 2002; Scott et al. 1995 ). An employer might also fi nd it advantageous to tap its traditional defi ned benefi t plan or otherwise create fi nancial incentives for early retirement (Freeman 2006) .
(iii) Defi ned contribution plans and cash balance plans tend to be neutral about the age of retirement Defi ned contribution plans (and their cash balance cousins) can also be designed to infl uence the timing of a worker's decision about when to retire, but usually these plans have signifi cantly less impact on those decisions. For example, a recent study by Friedberg and Webb (2004) found that the absence of age-related incentives in defi ned contribution plans led workers to retire an average of almost two years later than workers with traditional defi ned benefi t plans.
To be sure, defi ned contribution plans have large income and wealth eff ects. Access to pension income, whether from a defi ned benefi t plan or a defi ned contribution plan, makes retirement in general more attractive, but defi ned contribution plans typically do not incorporate plan design provisions that are intended to encourage early retirement.
68 Because these plans 67 As already explained, the accrual rate for traditional fi nal-average-pay plans increases rapidly as workers age. It also costs employers more to provide health insurance coverage for older workers than for younger workers. In fact, the cost of health insurance coverage is twice as high for working men over age 50 than for those under 50 (Committee for Economic Development 1999). The costs of life insurance coverage also naturally increase as workers age, as do the costs associated with work injury and disability. Moreover, many companies tie salaries and paid time off or vacation to age and tenure.
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Of course, defi ned contribution plans and cash balance plans can be designed to infl uence the timing of retirement. Daniel Dulitzky summarizes the factors related to defi ned contribution plans that can infl uence the timing of retirement as follows: employer contribution rates that may change according to age or years of service, early retirement provisions (explicit buyouts), specifi c tax rules that may aff ect the timing of retirement (such as penalties for early withdrawal), and potential availability of a lump sum on the condition of leaving the fi rm (Dulitzky 1999, p. 5). are not typically backloaded, vested workers do not suff er benefi t losses from changing jobs or retiring too early. 69 Nor do workers face fi nancial penalties for working past the plans' normal or earlier retirement ages. All in all, defi ned contribution plans (and cash balance plans) tend to be neutral about the age of retirement (Johnson and Steuerle 2003; Diamond 2005) .
D Retiree health benefi ts also infl uence the timing of retirement
Also of note, the availability -or unavailability -of health insurance after retirement has 'a powerful eff ect' on the timing of employee retirement (Aaron 1999, p. 53) . Workers who have retiree health coverage are likely to retire much earlier than those who do not. One study estimated that the availability of retiree health insurance increased retirement rates by 26 per cent for men and 31 per cent for women .
Other retirement policy issues
A Only about half of Americans have pensions
According to Harvard University Law Professor Daniel Halperin, 'ideally, every employer would have a plan covering all their employees ' (2003, p. 42) . Measured against this standard, the current pension system must be viewed as a failure. The overall coverage rate for retirement plans has held relatively steady in recent years, with only about half of private-sector employees participating in an employer-sponsored retirement plan. For example, of the 157 million Americans workers in 2006, just 78.6 million (50.0 per cent) worked for an employer (or union) that sponsored a retirement plan, and just 62.3 million (39.7 per cent) participated in that plan (Copeland 2007a, pp. 23-4 (fi gure 17)). Table 19 .5 provides details about employer sponsorship of retirement plans in 2006 and worker participation in those plans. For example, the probability of pension coverage is greater for older workers, whites, highly educated workers, higher-income workers, full-time workers and workers at larger fi rms. Participation rates increased through age 55 and then declined. But even among older workers aged 55 to 64, only 49.0 per cent participated in a pension plan in 2006. 69 Instead, mobile employees can typically roll over their individual account accruals and accumulate large account balances to be used for retirement. Indeed, this portability is one of the most important advantages of defi ned contribution plans, especially for women, who typically have shorter job tenures because of greater child and dependent care responsibilities. National Economic Council Interagency Working Group on Social Security (1998); Heinz et al. (2006) . Table 19 .5 shows that the probability of participating in a pension plan increases signifi cantly with income level. While 64.7 per cent of workers with annual earnings of $50 000 or more participated in a plan in 2006, only 16.2 per cent of workers earning between $10 000 and $14 999 participated that year. Similarly, while 49.1 per cent of full-time, full-year workers participated in a pension plan, just 19.0 per cent of part-time, full-year workers participated. Table 19 .5 also shows that the probability of a worker participating in an employment-based retirement plan increases signifi cantly with the size of her employer. Workers in small businesses are particularly hard hit: while 52.1 per cent of employees at fi rms with 1000 or more workers participated in a pension plan in 2006, only 20.9 per cent of workers at fi rms with ten to 24 workers participated in a plan that year.
Participation in Individual Retirement Accounts is even lower than participation in employment-based plans. For example, only 3.3 million tax returns for 2006 showed deductible IRA contributions that year, and their deductible contributions totaled just over $12 billion (Copeland 2007b) . As with employment-based plans, participation in IRAs tends to be highest among those who are older, those who have attained a higher educational level, and those who have a higher income level.
On the bright side, since 2004 we have made it easier for employers to automatically enroll employees in IRC § 401(k) plans, and we have made the retirement savings tax credit permanent. But these small steps will not avert a retirement income crisis for the baby boomers and beyond.
At the very least, we need to make sure that every worker has an easy way to save for retirement. For example, we could require all employers to off er pension plans, 401(k) plans or, at least, payroll-deduction IRAs. Even with universal access, however, many workers simply will not save for retirement (Turner and Verma 2007) . Making the saver's tax credit refundable could also help encourage workers to save for retirement (Befort 2007, pp. 982-6; Gale et al. 2005) . In the end, however, we will probably need to establish a mandatory universal pension system (President's Commission on Pension Policy 1981). We could start by requiring workers to contribute 3 per cent of earnings to individual retirement savings accounts (Carasso and Forman 2007) . Then, over a decade or so, we could gradually increase the required contribution level up to 10 per cent of earnings, and, at the same time, we might phase out the current voluntary pension system.
B The current system may not provide adequate retirement incomes
The combination of earlier retirements and longer life expectancies has led a number of analysts to express concern about the fi nancial prospects of elderly retirees in the 21st century (Congressional Budget Offi ce 2003). The United States already has 36 million residents who are aged 65 and over and 4.7 million who are aged 85 and over (He et al. 2005, p. 6) . By 2030, however, the United States will have 72 million residents aged 65 and over, and it will have 9.6 million residents aged 85 and over. The economic problems of these elderly citizens will be of paramount importance to the nation in the 21st century (Thompson 1998) .
Despite the voluntary nature of the current pension system, it does appear that most Americans are saving enough to meet their retirement income needs (Korczyk 2008; Butricia et al. 2007 ). Still, a substantial minority of households are not saving enough. Engen et al. (2005) estimate that at least a quarter risk being unprepared, and even the more optimistic estimates by Scholz et al. (2006) show that 19 per cent of households are undersaving for retirement.
C There are fewer traditional defi ned benefi t plans
In recent years, there has been a marked shift away from traditional defi ned benefi t plans and toward defi ned contribution plans and their cash balance cousins. Many medium and large private establishments have switched from defi ned benefi t plans to defi ned contribution plans. See Table 19 .6.
Among the reasons for the shift toward defi ned contribution plans are the higher administrative costs associated with defi ned benefi t plans, employment shifts from large to small fi rms, the decline in unionism, the rise of 401(k) plans, workers' interests in having more portable pensions, and fi rms' interests in attracting younger workers and in having pensions that encourage later retirement (Even and Macpherson 2003) . Lately even economically healthy employers have been freezing or abandoning their traditional defi ned benefi t plans (VanDerhei 2007; . All in all, the era of the traditional defi ned benefi t plan is largely behind us (Zelinsky 2007) .
D The trend toward phased retirement and bridge jobs
As America ages, the workforce has also begun to change. Since the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's elimination of age-65 mandatory retirement, phased or gradual retirement has started to replace the traditional 'cliff ' retirement pattern in which older workers would leave the workforce and never return. Many older Americans stay in or re-enter the workforce, especially in part-time and contingent work situations (Herz 1995; Quinn 1999; Penner et al. 2002; Chen and Scott 2006) . According to one estimate, roughly one-third of older workers leave their long-held career jobs in favor of new jobs that serve as a bridge to full retirement (Committee for Economic Development 1999, p. 9).
E The decline of annuitization
Another signifi cant retirement plan trend is the general decline of annuitization among American workers. 70 The shift to defi ned contribution plans is part of the story, but defi ned benefi t plans are also changing. For example, 52 per cent of participants in medium and large defi ned benefi t plans were permitted to take a lump-sum distribution in 2005, up from 14 per cent in 1991 (BLS 2007b, table 51; Copeland 2005) . Moreover, among defi ned contribution plans, lump-sum payouts are increasingly prevalent, 70 An annuity converts a lump sum of money into a stream of income payable for life. Annuitization is the process of converting a lump sum into an annuity. and a declining fraction of participants even have access to a life annuity as a payout option. One study of the plans of medium and large fi rms found that just 27 per cent of those with 401(k) plans could take their funds as a life annuity (Mitchell with Dykes 2003) . Annuities help ensure that workers and their families will not outlive their retirement savings, and infl ation-adjusted annuities keep benefi ts from eroding because of infl ation (GAO 1997, p. 49 ). Yet while workers approaching retirement age are concerned about maintaining a reasonable standard of living throughout their retirement years, they do not seem to like annuities (Yakoboski 2005; Gentry and Rothschild 2006) . Retirees often prefer lump-sum distributions to annuities in pension plans and they rarely choose to buy annuities in the marketplace. Part of the problem is that the premiums associated with annuities in the individual annuity market tend to be fairly high (Mitchell et al. 2007b ). Another problem is that older Americans tend to be myopic in their decisions about annuities. They underestimate their life expectancies, overestimate their fi nancial ability to meet their future retirement income needs and fail to understand the deleterious eff ects of infl ation.
The government could combat this myopic decision-making by encouraging or even requiring retirement pension plans to pay benefi ts in the form of annuities, perhaps even indexed-for-infl ation annuities. Such annuities would keep the purchasing power of benefi ts relatively constant over time by lowering initial benefi ts enough to pay for higher benefi ts later on (Steuerle et al. 1999) . Alternatively, Congress could require that all plans at least off er participants the option of taking benefi ts in the form of an infl ation-adjusted annuity. Another approach would be to encourage the purchase of deferred annuities. For example, a 65-year-old retiree could use some of her assets to buy an age 85 longevity annuity where payouts only commence when and if the purchaser reaches age 85. Longevity annuities can be an extremely effi cient form of longevity insurance (Scott 2008; Hu and Scott 2007; Webb et al. 2007 ). Aaron, Henry (1999) 
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